Abstract: Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely to get distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.
Introduction
School choice is referred in the literature on education as giving parents a say in the choice of the schools their children will attend. A recent paper by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) has lead to an upsurge of enthusiasm in the use of matching theory for the design and study of school choice mechanisms. 1 Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) discuss critical flaws of the current procedures of some school districts in the US to assign children to public schools. They point out that the widely used Boston Mechanism has the serious shortcoming that it is not in the parents' best interest to reveal their true preferences. Using a mechanism design approach, they propose and analyze two alternative student assignment mechanisms that do not have this shortcoming: the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
Real-life school choice situations typically involve a large number of participants and a relatively small number of school programs. For instance, in the school district of New York city each year more than 90,000 students have to be assigned to about 500 school programs . Parents are asked to elicit a preference list containing only a limited number of schools (currently up to 12). This restriction is reason for concern. Since complete revelation of one's true preferences is typically no longer an option in this case, the argument that Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism are strategyproof is no longer valid. Imposing a curb on the length of the submitted lists, though certainly having the merit of "simplifying" matters, has the perverse effect of forcing participants not to be truthful, and eventually compel them to adopt a strategic behavior when choosing which ordered list to submit. In other words, we are back in the situation of the Boston Mechanism where participants are forced to play a complicated admission game. Participants may adopt strategic behavior because the "quantitative" effect, i.e., participants cannot reveal their complete preference lists, is likely to have a "qualitative" effect, that is, participants may self-select by not declaring their most preferred options. For instance, if a participant fears rejection by his most preferred programs, it can be advantageous not to apply to these programs and use instead its allowed application slots for less preferred programs.
The goal of this paper is to scrutinize the effects of imposing a quota (i.e., a maximal length of submittable preference lists) on the strategic behavior of students. Thereby we revive an issue that was initially discussed by Romero-Medina (1998) . 2 To this end, we study school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where a number of students has to be assigned to a number of schools, each of which has a limited capacity of seats. Students have preferences over schools and remaining unassigned and schools have exogenously given priority rankings over students. 3 We introduce a non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (the quota) of schools to be acceptable. Each possible quota, from 1 up to the total number of schools, together with a student assignment mechanism induces a strategic "quota-game." We analyze the Nash equilibria and focus on the stability of the induced outcomes. Stability is the central concept in the two-sided matching literature 4 and does not lose its importance in the closely related model of school choice. Loosely speaking, stability of an assignment obtains when, for any student, all the schools he prefers to the one he is assigned to have exhausted their capacity with students that have higher priority. Hence, if an assignment is not stable then a student can seek legal action against the school district authorities for not getting assigned a seat which is either unfilled or filled by a student with a lower priority. Moreover, violations of stability are rather easily detectable; one does not need to consider larger groups of students or schools.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. For all three mechanisms Nash equilibrium and for any quota, Nash equilibria in pure strategies exist. In fact, a straightforward extension of a result due to Ergin and Sönmez (2006) says that the Boston mechanisms implements the set of stable matching, independently of the quota. For the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies was proved by Romero-Medina (1998) . For the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism the proof of existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies is more tortuous. We first show that the Nash equilibrium outcomes do not vary with the quota, and then invoke the strategy-proofness of the mechanism for the unconstrained case.
Next, given the direct implementation result for the Boston Mechanism we only need to analyze the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. We first establish that the associated quota-games have a common feature: the equilibria are nested with respect to the quota. More precisely, given a quota any Nash equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium under any less stringent quota. This leads to the following important observation: If a Nash equilibrium outcome in a quota-game has an undesirable property then this is not simply due to the presence of a constraint on the size of submittable lists. The two mechanisms are different in another aspect: unlike the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, under the StudentOptimal Stable Mechanism any stable matching can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium, independently of the quota. Yet, in general, under both mechanisms there are also unstable Nash equilibrium outcomes. We exhibit a school choice problem with a (strong) Nash equilibrium in "intuitive" undominated truncations that yields an unstable matching. On the positive side we identify for each of the two mechanisms a necessary and sufficient condition on the priorities to guarantee stable Nash equilibrium outcomes. In the case of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism this turns out to be Ergin's (2002) acyclicity condition. For the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism the necessary and sufficient condition is Kesten's (2006a) acyclicity condition. In other words, the two acyclicity condition are necessary and sufficient conditions on the priority structure for the implementation of the set of stable matchings in the two direct preference revelation games.
As a policy implication, our results suggest on the positive side that stability in the restrictive procedure is obtained through strategic interaction if the assignment of students is based on a common priority ranking. On the negative side, in view of the implementation result via the Boston Mechanism and the restrictiveness of both acyclicity conditions, the transition to either the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.
Besides its policy implications, our paper gives additional strength to Ergin's (2002) and Kesten's (2006a) acyclicity conditions. Ergin (2002) showed that his acyclicity condition on the priority structure is sufficient for Pareto-efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. Maybe somewhat surprisingly, the same acyclicity condition also serves to guarantee the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism. Kesten (2006a) showed that his acyclicity on the priority structure is sufficient for resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. He also proved that the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. We show that exactly the same condition also guarantees the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes under the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the model of school choice. In Section 3 we describe the three mechanisms and provide an illustrative example. In Section 4, we introduce the strategic game induced by the imposition of a quota on the revealed preferences. In Sections 5, 6, and 7 we present our results on the existence, nestedness, and stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes for the quota-game under the Boston, StudentOptimal Stable, and Top Trading Cycles Mechanism, respectively. In Section 8 we study Nash equilibria of undominated truncations for the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. Finally, in Section 9 we discuss the policy implications of our results and possible future research directions. All proofs are relegated to the Appendices.
School Choice
In a school choice problem (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) , there are a number of schools and a number of students each of which has to be assigned a seat at not more than one of the schools. Each student is assumed to have strict preferences over his acceptable set of schools. Each school is endowed with a strict priority ordering of all students and a fixed capacity of seats that can be filled.
Formally, a school choice problem is a 5-tuple (I, S, q, P, f ) that consists of 1. a set of students I = {i 1 , . . . , i n };
2. a set of schools S = {s 1 , . . . , s m };
3. a capacity vector q = (q 1 , . . . , q m );
4. a profile of strict student preferences P = (P i 1 , . . . , P in );
5. a strict priority structure of the schools over the students f = (f s 1 , . . . , f sm ).
We denote by i and s a generic student and a generic school, respectively. An agent is an element of V := I ∪ S. A generic agent is denoted by v. With a slight abuse of notation we write v for singletons {v} ⊆ V .
The preference relation P i of student i is a linear order over S ∪ i, where i denotes the option of remaining unassigned. Student i is said to prefer school s to school s if sP i s . School s is acceptable to i if sP i i. Henceforth, when describing a particular preference relation of a student we will only represent acceptable schools. For instance, P i = s, s means that student i's most preferred school is s, his second best s , and any other school is unacceptable. For the sake of convenience, if all schools are unacceptable for i then we sometimes write P i = i instead of P i = ∅. Let R i denote the weak preference relation associated with the preference relation P i .
The priority ordering f s of school s assigns ranks to students according to their priority for school s. The rank of student i for school s is f s (i). Then, f s (i) < f s (j) means that student i has higher priority (or lower rank) for school s than student j. For s ∈ S and i ∈ I, we denote U f s (i) for the set of students that have higher priority than student i for school s, i.e., U f s (i) = {j ∈ I : f s (j) < f s (i)}.
Throughout the paper we fix the set of students I and the set of schools S. Hence, a school choice problem is given by a triple (P, f, q), and simply by P when no confusion is possible.
School choice is closely related to the college admissions model (Gale and Shapley ,1962) . The only but key difference between the two models is that in school choice schools are mere "objects" to be consumed by students, whereas in the college admissions model (or more generally, in twosided matching) both sides of the market are agents with preferences over the other side. In other words, a college admissions problem is given by 1-4 above and 5' below: 5'. a profile of strict school preferences P S = (P s 1 , . . . , P sm ), where P s denotes the strict preference relation of school s ∈ S over all students.
Priority orderings in school choice can be reinterpreted as school preferences in the college admissions model. Therefore, many results or concepts for the college admissions model have their natural counterpart for school choice. 5 In particular, an outcome of a school choice or college admissions problem is a matching µ : I ∪ S → 2 I ∪ S such that for any i ∈ I and any s ∈ S,
• µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s);
For v ∈ V , we call µ(v) agent v's allotment, respectively. For i ∈ I, if µ(i) = s ∈ S then student i is said to be assigned a seat at school s under µ. If µ(i) = i then student i is said to be unassigned under µ. For convenience we often write a matching as a collection of sets. For instance, µ = {{i 1 , i 2 , s 1 }, {i 3 }, {i 4 , s 2 }} denotes the matching in which students i 1 and i 2 each are assigned a seat at school s 1 , student i 3 is unassigned, and student i 4 is assigned a seat at school s 2 .
A key property of matchings in the two-sided matching literature is stability. Informally, a matching is stable if there is no blocking pair school-student such that the student prefers to occupy a seat of the school, and the school reciprocally prefers to let the student occupy a seat (by possibly dismissing one of its current students). Stability does not lose its importance in the context of school choice. The reason is that if a matching is not stable then a student can seek legal action against the school district authorities for not getting assigned a seat which is either unfilled or filled by a student with a lower priority. Formally, let P be a school choice problem. A matching µ is stable if
• it is individually rational, i.e., for all i ∈ I, µ(i)R i i;
• it is non-wasteful (Balinski and Sönmez, 1999) , i.e., for all i ∈ I and all s ∈ S, sP i µ(i) implies |µ(s)| = q s ;
• there is no justified envy, i.e., for all i, j ∈ I with µ(j) = s ∈ S, sP i µ(i) implies f s (j) < f s (i).
It will be convenient to denote the set of individually rational matchings by IR(P ), the set of non-wasteful matchings by N W (P ), and the set of stable matchings by S(P ).
Another desirable property for a matching is Pareto-efficiency. In the context of school choice, the schools are mere "objects." Therefore, to determine whether a matching is Pareto-efficient we should only take into account the students. A matching ν Pareto dominates a matching µ if all students prefer ν to µ and there is at least one student that strictly prefers ν to µ. Formally, ν Pareto dominates µ if ν(i)R i µ(i) for all i ∈ I, and ν(i )P i µ(i ) for some i ∈ I. A matching is Pareto-efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other matching.
A (student assignment) mechanism systematically selects a matching for each school choice problem. A mechanism is individual rational if it always selects an individually rational matching. Similarly, one can speak of non-wasteful, stable, or Pareto-efficient mechanisms.
A mechanism is strategy-proof if no student can ever benefit by unilaterally misrepresenting his preferences. A mechanism is non-bossy (Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein, 1981) if no student can maintain his allotment and cause a change in the other students' allotments by reporting different preferences. Formally, a mechanism ϕ is non-bossy if for all i ∈ I, Q i , Q i ∈ Q(m), and
The Competing Mechanisms
In this section we describe the mechanisms that we study in the context of constrained school choice: the Boston Mechanism, the Gale-Shapley Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism, and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. The three mechanisms are direct mechanisms and for any priority structure and reported students' preferences they find a matching via the following algorithms. Let (I, S, q, P, f ) be a school choice problem. Set q 1 s := q s for all s ∈ S. We sometimes use an additional superindex P and hence write q P,1 s , etc. to avoid possible confusion.
The Boston Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i proposes to his most preferred school in P i (if i finds all schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school s assigns up to q 1 s seats to its proposers one at a time following the priority order f s . Remaining students are rejected. Let q 2 s denote the number of available seats at school s. If q 2 s = 0 then school s is removed.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to his next preferred school in P i (if i finds all remaining schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). School s assigns up to q l s seats to its (new) proposers one at a time following the priority order f s . Remaining students are rejected. Let q l s denote the number of available seats at school s. If q l s = 0 then school s is removed.
The algorithm stops when no student is rejected or all schools have been removed. Any remaining student remains unassigned. Let β(P ) denote the matching. The mechanism β is the Boston Mechanism.
The Boston Mechanism is individually rational, non-wasteful, and Pareto-efficient. However, it is not stable nor strategy-proof.
The Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i proposes to his most preferred school in P i (if i finds all schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school s tentatively assigns up to q s seats to its proposers one at a time following the priority order f s . Remaining students are rejected.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that is rejected in Step l − 1 proposes to his next preferred school in P i (if i finds all remaining schools unacceptable he remains unassigned). Each school s considers the new proposers and the students that have a (tentative) seat at s. School s tentatively assigns up to q s seats to these students one at a time following the priority order f s . Remaining students are rejected.
The algorithm ends when no student is rejected. Each student is assigned to his final tentative school. Let γ I (P ) = γ(P ) denote the matching. The mechanism γ is the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism.
The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is a stable mechanism that is Pareto superior to any other stable matching mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962 ). An additional important property of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism is that it is strategy-proof (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982) . Ergin (2002) showed that "weak acyclicity" of the priority structure is sufficient for Pareto-efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. 6 Finally, by letting the schools propose in the DA-algorithm we obtain, from the students' point of view, the worst stable matching, the School-Optimal Stable Matching, denoted by γ S (P ). 7
The Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Algorithm
Step 1: Each student i points to his most preferred school in P i (if i finds all schools unacceptable he points to himself, i.e., he forms a self-cycle). Each school s points to the student that has the highest priority in f s . There is at least one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q 1 s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q 1 s > 1, then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes q 2 s := q 1 s − 1.
Step l, l ≥ 2: Each student i that has not been removed yet points to his most preferred school in P i that has not been removed at some step r, r < l, or points to himself if he finds all remaining schools unacceptable. Each school s points to the student with the highest priority in f s among the students that have not been removed at a step r, r < l. There is at least one cycle. If a student is in a cycle he is assigned a seat at the school he points to (or to himself if he is in a self-cycle). Students that are assigned are removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q l s = 1, then the school is removed. If a school s is in a cycle and q l s > 1, then the school is not removed and its capacity becomes q l+1 s := q l s − 1. The algorithm stops when all students or all schools have been removed. Any remaining student is assigned to himself. Let τ (P ) denote the matching. The mechanism τ is the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) . 8 The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is a Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof mechanism (see Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003 , for proofs in the context of school choice). The mechanism is also individually rational and non-wasteful. Kesten (2006a) showed that "acyclicity" of the priority structure is sufficient for resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. He also proved that the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. 9 We illustrate the working of the three mechanisms in the following example.
Example 3.1 Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 2, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below. So, for instance,
If the students truthfully report their preference lists, then the mechanisms yield the following matchings.
The Boston Mechanism. In Step 1 of the Boston Algorithm each student proposes to his most preferred school. So, school s 1 receives a proposal from i 2 and i 3 . Student i 2 has a higher priority, so i 3 's proposal is rejected and i 1 is assigned the unique seat at s 1 . School s 2 receives a proposal from i 1 and i 4 . Since school s 2 has 2 seats each of the students i 1 and i 4 is assigned a seat at s 2 .
8 The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was inspired by Gale's Top Trading Cycles Algorithm which was used by Roth and Postlewaite (1977) to obtain the unique core allocation for housing markets (Shapley and Scarf ,1974) .
9 A variant of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism was introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) for a model of house allocation with existing tenants. Pápai (2000) introduced the class of hierarchical exchange rules of which the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism is a special case. She characterized the class of hierarchical exchange rules to be the only mechanisms that are Pareto-efficient, group strategy-proof (i.e., immune to preference misrepresentations by groups of agents), and reallocation-proof (i.e., immune to manipulations by mispresenting preferences and swapping the assigned objects ex post by pairs of agents).
Schools s 1 and s 2 have filled all their seats and hence are removed. The tentative matching is {{s 1 , i 2 }, {s 2 , i 1 , i 4 }, {s 3 }, {i 3 }} .
In
Step 2 student i 3 cannot propose to his next preferred school, s 2 . Since he finds school s 3 unacceptable he is removed and remains unassigned. So, the final matching is given by
The Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism.
In Step 1 of the DA algorithm each student proposes to his most preferred school. So, school s 1 receives a proposal from i 2 and i 3 . Student i 2 has a higher priority, so i 3 's proposal is rejected. School s 2 receives a proposal from i 1 and i 4 . Since school s 2 has 2 seats it does not reject any of the two students. The tentative matching is {{s 1 , i 2 }, {s 2 , i 1 , i 4 }, {s 3 }, {i 3 }} .
Step 2 student i 3 proposes to school s 2 . So, now school s 2 has two (tentatively) accepted students, i 1 and i 4 , and one new proposal, from i 3 . Since school s 2 has 2 seats it rejects i 1 , the student with the lowest priority. The tentative matching becomes {{s 1 , i 2 }, {s 2 , i 3 , i 4 }, {s 3 }, {i 1 }} .
Step 3 student i 1 proposes to school s 1 . The unique seat of school s 1 is tentatively occupied by i 2 . Since i 1 has a higher priority than student i 2 , the latter is rejected. The tentative matching becomes {{s 1 , i 1 }, {s 2 , i 3 , i 4 }, {s 3 }, {i 2 }} .
Step 4 student i 2 proposes to school s 3 . Since school s 3 's unique seat is available, student i 2 is accepted. No student has been rejected in this step, so the tentative matching is the final matching and is given by
The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism.
In Step 1 of the TTC algorithm each student points to his most preferred school, and each school points to the student with highest priority. There is a unique cycle that is given by (i 1 , s 2 , i 3 , s 1 ). So, students i 1 and i 3 are assigned a seat at schools s 2 and s 1 , respectively. Students i 1 and i 3 are removed. Since school s 1 had only 1 available seat it is also removed. School s 2 still has an available seat and is therefore not removed. The tentative matching is {{s 1 , i 3 }, {s 2 , i 1 }, {s 3 }, {i 2 }, {i 4 }} .
Step 2 there is a unique cycle given by (i 4 , s 2 ). So, student i 4 is assigned the remaining seat at school s 2 . Both student i 4 and school s 2 are removed. The tentative matching is
Step 3 only student i 2 and school s 3 remain. Since i 2 finds school s 3 acceptable, he points to the school. Since i 2 is the only remaining student, school s 3 points to i 2 . This creates a cycle and hence i 2 is assigned a seat at school s 3 . So, the final matching is
Note that for the school choice problem above the three mechanisms generate different matchings. Also, the obtained matchings illustrate directly some of the "problems" of the mechanisms. For instance, β(P ) is Pareto-efficient but not stable because student i 3 has justified envy with respect to school s 2 and any of the students that occupy a seat. In fact, one readily sees that β is not strategy-proof. (Would student i 3 have announced the list that only contains school s 2 he would have guaranteed a seat at this school.) Similarly, one easily verifies that γ(P ) is stable but not Pareto-efficient and that τ (P ) is Pareto-efficient but not stable. More importantly, note that if in a direct revelation game under γ or τ students could only submit a list of 2 schools, student i 2 would remain unassigned (and the other students unaffected), provided that each student submits the list with his two most preferred schools. Therefore, if students can only submit short preference lists, then (at least) student i 3 would have to strategize.
Constrained Preference Revelation: the Quota-Game
Fix the priority ordering f and the capacities q. We consider the following school choice procedure. Students are asked to submit (simultaneously) preference lists Q = (Q i 1 , . . . , Q in ) of "length" at most k (i.e., preference lists with at most k acceptable schools). Here, k is a positive integer, 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and is called the quota. Subsequently, a mechanism ϕ is used to obtain the matching ϕ(Q) and for all i ∈ I, student i is assigned a seat at school ϕ(Q)(i).
It is clear that the above procedure induces a strategic-form game, the Quota-Game Γ ϕ (P, k) = I, Q(k) I , P . The set of players is the set of students I. The strategy set of each student is the set of preference lists with at most k acceptable schools and is denoted by Q(k). Let Q = Q(m). Outcomes of the game are evaluated through the true preferences P = (P i 1 , . . . , P in ), where with some abuse of notation P denotes the straightforward extension of the preference relation over schools and the null school to matchings. That is, for all i ∈ I and matchings µ and µ , µP i µ if and only if µ(i)P i µ (i).
For any profile of preferences Q ∈ Q I and any i ∈ I, we write Q −i for the profile of preferences that is obtained from Q after leaving out preferences Q i of student i. A profile of submitted preference lists Q ∈ Q(k)
I is a Nash equilibrium in the game Γ ϕ (P, k) (or k-Nash equilibrium for short) if for all i ∈ I and all
Boston Mechanism
Our first result that will serve as a benchmark for the other two mechanisms states that the Boston Mechanism implements the set of stable matchings, independently of the quota. This follows directly from a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1 in Ergin and Sönmez (2006) . 10 Its proof is therefore omitted.
Theorem 5.1 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any school choice problem P , the game Γ β (P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
Our first concern is the existence of Nash equilibria in pure strategies. This question is easily settled in the next proposition. In fact, the next proposition states that any stable matching is the outcome of some Nash equilibrium, and each outcome of some Nash equilibrium is at least individually rational and non-wasteful.
Proposition 6.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k,
We are in position to prove a first important result: the equilibria of the Quota-Games are nested in the sense that for 1 ≤ k < m any k-Nash equilibrium is also a (k +1)-Nash equilibrium. In other words, if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium for some quota then it is also a Nash equilibrium for all less stringent quotas. Obviously, this also implies that the sets of Nash equilibrium outcomes are nested. An important consequence of this result is that violation of stability in equilibrium is not simply caused by the presence of a quota imposed on the students' preference lists. Indeed, if for some quota k a Nash equilibrium outcome is unstable then this unstable matching is also supported at (the same) equilibrium when the quota is set to m (the number of school) which is equivalent to not imposing any quota.
Proposition 6.2 For any school choice problem P and quotas
Now we will explore whether the first inclusion of Proposition 6.1 can be reversed. In other words: is the outcome of each Nash equilibrium in the game Γ γ (P, k) free of justified envy with respect to the true preferences P ? We start off with a positive answer for the restrictive case of k = 1. Proposition 6.3 For any school choice problem P , S(P ) = O γ (P, 1).
In Implementation Theory jargon, Proposition 6.3 says that the game Γ γ (P, 1) implements the set of stable matchings for P in Nash equilibria. The following example shows that for any quota k = 1 this is in general not true.
Example 6.4 An Unstable Nash Equilibrium Outcome in Γ γ (P, k) for quota k = 1 Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
Using the DA-algorithm one finds γ I (P ) = γ S (P ) = {{i 1 , s 1 }, {i 3 , s 2 }, {i 2 }}. Hence, S(P ) = {γ I (P )} consists of the unique stable matching in which i 1 and i 3 are assigned to s 1 and s 2 , respectively, and i 2 remains unassigned.
Let k = 2 be the quota. Consider the truth-telling strategy for students i 1 and i 3 , i.e., let Q i 1 = P i 1 and Q i 3 = P i 3 , respectively. Regarding student i 2 , consider his 5 possible strategies in
One easily verifies that for any profile Q = (
Hence, at γ(Q * ) students i 1 and i 3 are assigned to their most preferred school. So, neither i 1 nor i 3 has a profitable deviation. Hence, Q * ∈ E γ (P, 2). However, γ(Q * ) = {{i 1 , s 2 }, {i 3 , s 1 }, {i 2 }} is not stable for P . (Student i 2 has justified envy for school
Note that for k > 2, n > 3, and/or m > 2 one can obtain an unstable k-Nash equilibrium outcome by making schools s 1 and s 2 unacceptable in the other students' preferences and the other schools unacceptable for students i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 .
In Example 6.4 student i 2 can block a potential settlement between the other two students without affecting his own position:
(This in fact shows that γ is bossy.) Moreover, the restricted capacities of the schools makes that there is competition for the schools. These are the two ingredients that generate an unstable Nash equilibrium outcome. In fact, the example exhibits a strongly cyclic priority structure (Ergin, 2002) .
Definition 6.5 Strong Cycles and Weak Acyclicity (Ergin, 2002) Given a priority structure f , a strong cycle is constituted of distinct s, s ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I such that the following two conditions are satisfied: cycle condition f s (i) < f s (j) < f s (l) and f s (l) < f s (i) and c-scarcity condition there exist disjoint sets I s , I s ⊆ I\{i, j, l} (possibly
A priority structure is weakly acyclic if no strong cycles exist. Ergin (2002) showed that weak acyclicity of the priority structure is sufficient for Paretoefficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. Our first main result says that weak acyclicity is also a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee that for any profile of student preferences all Nash equilibrium outcomes are stable matchings: Theorem 6.6 Let k = 1. Then, f is a weakly acyclic priority structure if and only if for any school choice problem P , the game Γ γ (P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
For starters, the Nash equilibrium of the Quota-Game induced by the Top Trading Cycles mechanism are at least individually rational and non-wasteful.
Proposition 7.1 For any school choice problem P and quota k, O τ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) ∩ N W (P ) .
Following the structure of Section 6 and before turning to the implementation of the set of stable matchings, we first turn to the counterpart of Proposition 6.2. The following definition introduces a property that guarantees that a mechanism has nested Nash equilibria.
Definition 7.2 Individually Idempotent Mechanism
Let ϕ be a mechanism. We say that ϕ is individually idempotent if for any Q ∈ Q I , any i ∈ I,
Proposition 7.3 Let ϕ be an individually idempotent mechanism. For any school choice problem P and quotas k < k , E ϕ (P, k) ⊆ E ϕ (P, k ).
Lemma 7.4 Mechanism τ is individually idempotent.
Corollary 7.5 For any school choice problem P and quotas
Note that a result due to Roth (1982) [Lemma A.1 in the Appendix] may suggest that γ is individually idempotent: for any Q ∈ Q I , any i ∈ I,
The next proposition reverses in a certain way Corollary 7.5: any matching that is sustained at some Nash equilibrium for a particular quota can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium for a more stringent quota.
Proposition 7.6 For any school choice problem P and quota k,
Given the result above, the next two examples show that the set of equilibrium outcomes is not a subset nor a superset of the set of stable matchings. In fact, Example 7.8 shows that the set of stable matchings and the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes can be disjoint sets.
Example 7.7 O τ (P, 1) S(P ) Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
Let k = 1 be the quota. Consider the profile Q = (s 3 , s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ Q(1) I . Clearly, τ (Q) = {{i 1 , s 3 }, {i 2 , s 1 }, {i 3 , s 2 }}. Notice that students i 2 and i 3 obtain their most preferred school, so student i is the only possible student that may profitably deviate. For any strategy student i 1 may choose, observe that the cycle (s 1 , i 3 , s 2 , i 2 , s 1 ) forms in the first step of the execution of the TTC algorithm. It follows that for any Q i 1 ∈ Q(1), τ ( Q i 1 , Q −i 1 )(i 1 ) is either i 1 or school s 3 . Hence, Q ∈ E τ (P, 1).
Yet, τ (Q) is not stable: student i 1 has a higher priority than student i 2 for school s 1 = τ (Q)(i 2 ) and student i 1 prefers school s 1 to s 3 , his matching under τ (Q).
Example 7.8 S(P ) O τ (P, 1) Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
It is easy to check that the unique stable matching is µ = {{i 1 }, {i 2 , s 1 }, {i 3 , s 2 }}. We show that µ cannot be sustained at any Nash equilibrium of the game Γ τ (P, 1). Suppose to the contrary that µ can be sustained at some Nash equilibrium. In other words, there is a profile Q ∈ Q(1) I such that τ (Q) = µ and Q ∈ E τ (P, 1). Since τ (Q) = µ, Q i 2 = s 1 and
However, it is clear that student i 1 is strictly better off by reporting Q i 1 = s 1 . Hence, Q ∈ E τ (P, 1), a contradiction.
Next, we show that Kesten's (2006a) acyclicity condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to implement the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibria.
Definition 7.9 Cycles and Acyclicity (Kesten, 2006a) Given a priority structure f , a cycle is constituted of distinct s, s ∈ S and i, j, l ∈ I such that the following two conditions are satisfied: cycle condition f s (i) < f s (j) < f s (l) and f s (l) < f s (i), f s (j) and c-scarcity condition there exists a (possibly empty) set I s ⊆ I\{i, j, l} with
A priority structure is acyclic if no cycles exist. Kesten (2006a) showed that acyclicity of the priority structure is sufficient for resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, and stability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism as well as necessary for each of these conditions separately. He also proved that the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism coincides with the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. The latter result and Proposition 7.6 together with our first main result (Theorem 6.6) are the driving force behind our second main result:
Theorem 7.10 Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, f is an acyclic priority structure if and only if for any school choice problem P , the game Γ τ (P, k) implements S(P ) in Nash equilibria.
Equilibria of Truncations
In this section we first strengthen Theorems 6.6 and 7.10 by exhibiting a school choice problem with a (strong) Nash equilibrium in "intuitive" undominated strategies that yields an unstable matching. Next, we will show that in general there is also no relation between the set of unassigned students at equilibrium and the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. However, for Nash equilibria in "intuitive" undominated strategies we do obtain positive results in this respect.
One piece of advise about which preference list a student should submit follows from the strategy-proofness of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism γ in the unrestricted case: it does not pay off to submit a list of schools that does not respect the true order. More precisely, a list that does not respect the order of a student's true preferences is weakly dominated by listing the same schools in the "true order." Let ϕ be a mechanism. Student i's strategy Q i ∈ Q(k) in the game Γ ϕ (P, k) is weakly k-dominated by another strategy
Lemma 8.1 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student. Consider two strategies Q i , Q i ∈ Q(k) such that (a) Q i and Q i contain the same set of schools, and (b) for any two schools s and s listed in Q i (or Q i ), sQ i s ⇒ sP i s . Then, Q i is weakly k-dominated by Q i in the games Γ γ (P, k) and Γ τ (P, k).
The message of Lemma 8.1 is clear: a student cannot lose (and may possibly gain) by submitting the same set of schools in the true order. A special type of strategies that satisfy this condition are the so-called truncations. A truncation of a preference list is a list obtained from the preference list by deleting some specific school and all less preferred acceptable schools. Formally, a truncation of a preference list P i is a list P i such that the schools in P i are contained in P i and sP i s implies sP i s . The following lemma says that in the games Γ γ (P, k) and Γ τ (P, k) submitting a truncation "as long as possible" is k-undominated. Formally, student i's strategy
Lemma 8.2 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Let i ∈ I be a student. Denote the number of (acceptable) schools in P i by |P i |. Then, the strategy P k i of submitting the first min{k, |P i |} schools of the true preference list P i in the true order is k-undominated in the games Γ γ (P, k) and Γ τ (P, k).
Although the strategy profile P k is a profile of k-undominated strategies, it is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in the game Γ ϕ (P, k). In case it is a Nash equilibrium it may still induce an unstable matching as the following example shows. This clearly strengthens Examples 6.4 and 7.7 in the sense that it shows that unstability is not simply due to the choice of a pathological equilibrium.
Example 8.3 For both γ and τ : Strong Nash Equilibrium in (Undominated) Truncations yields Unstable Matching. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
Let ϕ = γ, τ . Let k = 2 be the quota. Consider the strategy profile Q = P 2 ∈ Q(2) I of 2-undominated truncations:
One easily verifies that ϕ(Q) = {{i 1 , s 1 }, {i 2 , s 2 }, {i 3 , s 3 }, {i 4 }}. Since student i 4 has justified envy for school s 3 , ϕ(Q) ∈ S(P ). It remains to show that Q is a strong Nash equilibrium (cf. Aumann, 1959) in Γ ϕ (P, 2). Since students i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 are assigned a seat at their favorite school, it is sufficient to check that student i 4 has no profitable deviation. Notice that the only possibility for student i 4 to change the outcome of the mechanism is by listing school s 3 . So, the only strategies that we have to check are given byQ (2) 
, and Q e = s 3 , s 2 . By Lemma 8.1, Q d and Q e are weakly 2-dominated by Q b and Q c , respectively. So in fact we only have to consider strategies Q a , Q b , and Q c . Given the other students' strategies Q −i 4 and the priority orderings of s 1 and s 2 , for any of these three strategies for student i 4 , in the DA-algorithm i 4 is never tentatively assigned to Roth (1984) from college admissions to school choice gives that for any school choice problem, the set of unassigned students is the same for all stable matchings. 11 In other words, for µ, µ ∈ S(P ), µ(i) = i implies µ (i) = i. Given the restrictiveness of the acyclicity condition to guarantee stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, one may wonder whether at least always the set of unassigned students at equilibrium coincides with the set of unassigned students in stable matchings. In fact, a less ambitious idea would be to establish that at equilibrium the number of unassigned students equals the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. The following two examples show that in general this is not true. In other words, the number of unassigned students at equilibrium differs from the number of unassigned students in stable matchings. Given the first inclusion in Proposition 6.1, this in particular implies for the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism that the number of unassigned students can vary from one equilibrium outcome to another.
Example 8.4 For both γ and τ : Less Assigned Students at Equilibrium than in Stable Matchings
Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
One easily verifies that strategy profile Q given below is a Nash equilibrium in Γ γ (P, 2) and Γ τ (P, 2).
Since γ(Q) = τ (Q) = {{i 1 , s 1 }, {i 3 , s 3 }, {i 2 }, {s 2 }} and γ(P ) = {{i 1 , s 1 }, {i 2 , s 3 }, {i 3 , s 2 }}, there are less assigned students at γ(Q) = τ (Q) than in any stable matching.
Example 8.5 For both γ and τ : More Assigned Students at Equilibrium than in Stable Matchings. Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } be the set of students, S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } be the set of schools, and q = (1, 1, 1) be the capacity vector. The students' preferences P and the priority structure f are given in the table below.
Since γ(Q) = τ (Q) = {{i 1 , s 2 }, {i 2 , s 3 }, {i 3 , s 1 }} and γ(P ) = {{i 2 , s 3 }, {i 3 , s 2 }, {i 1 }, {s 1 }}, there are more assigned students at γ(Q) = τ (Q) than in any stable matching.
We obtain a positive result for γ if we restrict ourselves to equilibria in truncations. More precisely, the following proposition says that if a profile of truncations is a Nash equilibrium in the game Γ γ (P, k) then the set of assigned students at the equilibrium coincides with the set of assigned students at any stable matching. In fact, each Nash equilibrium in truncations in the game Γ γ (P, k) yields a matching that is either the Student-Optimal matching γ(P ) or Pareto dominates γ(P ). For a matching µ, denote M (µ) for the set of assigned students, i.e., M (µ) = {i ∈ I : µ(i) = i}. Proposition 8.6 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If the profile of truncations
For τ we cannot obtain a similar result as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 8.7 Let P be a school choice problem. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. If the profile of truncations
Discussion
In this section we first summarize our main findings. Next, we discuss their policy implications and our contribution to the literature on school choice. Finally, we conclude with some extensions of our results and possible directions for future research.
We have analyzed three prominent mechanisms to assign children to public schools on the basis of priority rankings. The main feature of our analysis is that the assignment procedure impedes students to fully reveal their true preferences. The Boston Mechanism, which in several school districts in the US is on the verge of being replaced by either one of (the other) two mechanisms proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) , is robust in the sense that stability is guaranteed in equilibrium, no matter the imposed quota on the length of the submittable preference lists. The other two mechanisms, which have desirable properties in the unconstrained case, do not perform as well. In the first place, we show that both mechanisms allow for equilibria in undominated strategies that induce unstable outcomes. In the second place, we identify two acyclicity conditions on the priority structure that are necessary and sufficient for the implementation of the set of stable matchings.
To fully understand the policy implications of our results, we first note that both acyclicity conditions are quite restrictive. 12 Stability of the equilibrium outcomes, though, is assured for both the Student-Optimal Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism if the assignment of students is based on a common priority ranking. In practice, however, multiple exogenous criteria are employed: geographic distance, social origin, the number of siblings attending the same school, etc. Hence, the transition of the Boston Mechanism to either of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools. Therefore, for policy makers opting for this transition possible efficiency gains (Chen and Ergin and should outweigh an increasing risk of violations of stability. Clearly, if the quota of the assignment procedure is not very restrictive (relative to the number of schools and seats), then most students can submit a truncation of their true preferences. In that case, the likelihood of problems due to unstability may remain small.
Apart from the policy implications of our results and providing an additional dimension to the acyclicity conditions due to Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006a) , we also contribute to the theory of implementation in matching markets. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper provides the first complete analysis of the equilibria in the preference revelation game induced by the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism. All previous studies, except Romero-Medina (1998), assumed preference revelation to be unconstrained. Given the strategy-proofness of both mechanisms in the unconstrained case, an analysis of all (other) equilibria was therefore in some sense not necessary. It is well-known that in the context of two-sided matching, preference revelation induced by stable mechanism may have unstable equilibrium outcomes (Alcalde, 1996 and Sönmez, 1997) . 13 In the context of school choice, where only one side of the market is strategic, Ergin and Sönmez (2006) showed that the negative result above can be avoided by using the Boston Mechanism. We show that in this sense also the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism can be employed, as long as the priority structure is acyclic.
We have analyzed three prominent student assignment mechanisms that are used or at the point of being adopted in several school districts in the US. As was pointed out by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism and the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism have desirable properties (at least in the unconstrained case). Still, one could consider alternative mechanisms. An obvious candidate is the School-Optimal Stable Mechanism γ S . Theorems 3 and 4 in Sotomayor (1996) imply the implementation of the stable set via γ S in Nash equilibria in the context of unconstrained school choice. A proof of the same result in the context of constrained school choice can be obtained by a straightforward adaptation of the proofs. Alternatively, one can adapt the proofs of Theorems 4.15 and 4.16 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) , which were originally proven in Gale and Sotomayor (1985a, Theorem 2) and Roth (1984) . 14 In spite of this positive implementation result, one should be aware that from the students' point of view the outcomes of the School-Optimal Stable Mechanism are worse than those of the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism. Again in the context of unconstrained school choice, Ergin and Sönmez (2006, Theorem 4) extended their implementation result of the Boston Mechanism to the class of so-called monotonic priority mechanisms. One can verify that this result can be further generalized to the case of constrained school choice. Finally, our results also hold in the model where policy makers can impose different quotas on different students.
Throughout our analysis we have assumed a complete information environment. Ergin and Sönmez (2006, Example 4) showed that the results for the Boston Mechanism do not carry over to incomplete information environments. Therefore, an important direction for future research would be to determine to what extent the predictions and results under the complete information assumption are robust to changes in the level of information. Analysis of field data and experimental studies may be very helpful.
A Appendix: Proofs Section 6
Proof of Proposition 6.1: By Gale and Shapley (1962) , S(P ) = ∅. We now prove that S(P ) ⊆ O γ (P, k). Let µ ∈ S(P ). Define Q i = µ(i) ∈ Q(k) for all i ∈ I. Since in the first step of the DA-algorithm for Q no student is rejected, γ(Q) = µ. It remains to prove that Q is a Nash equilibrium in the Quota-Game Γ γ (P, k). Suppose to the contrary that Q / ∈ E γ (P, k). Then there exists a student i and a strategy
Consider the DA-algorithm for (Q i , Q −i ). Of the students in I\i, only the students in µ(s) make their unique proposal to s; all other students make either a unique proposal to another school or make no proposal at all. Since γ(Q i , Q −i )(i) = s, it follows that student i starts making proposals but gets rejected until he proposes to s and get assigned a seat at s (now the DA-algorithm ends since no new proposals are made). Since under (Q i , Q −i ) school s accepts i it must be that |µ(s)| < q s or there is a student j ∈ µ(s) with f s (j) > f s (i). In the first case, µ is wasteful for P , contradicting µ ∈ S(P ). In the second case, µ is not stable for P (student i has justified envy), also contradicting µ ∈ S(P ). So, Q ∈ E γ (P, k).
Next, we prove that O γ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) ∩ N W (P ). Let Q ∈ E γ (P, k). It is immediate that γ(Q) ∈ IR(P ). We prove that γ(Q) ∈ N W (P ). Suppose to the contrary that γ(Q) ∈ N W (P ). Then, there is a student i ∈ I and a school s ∈ S with sP i γ(i) and |γ(Q)(s)| < q s . LetQ i be the empty list. LetQ = (Q i , Q −i ). By a result of Gale and Sotomayor (1985, Theorem 2) extended to the college admissions model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 5.34) , for each j ∈ I\i, either γ(Q)(j) = γ(Q)(j) or γ(Q)(j)Q j γ(Q)(j). Hence, the set of schools to which each j ∈ I\i proposes in DA(Q) is a subset of the schools to which he proposes in DA(Q). Since moreoverQ i is the empty list, each school receives in DA(Q) only a subset of the proposals of DA(Q). For school s this immediately implies that |γ(Q)(s)| ≤ |γ(Q)(s)| < q s . So, if we take
We will make use of the following result from two-sided matching to prove Proposition 6.2.
Lemma A.1 (Roth, 1982, Lemma 1; cf. Roth and Sotomayor 1990 , Lemma 4.8) Let P and P be two school choice problems. Let i ∈ I. Suppose P l = P l for all l ∈ I\i. Suppose P i is a preference list whose first choice is γ(P )(i) if γ(P )(i) = i, and the empty list otherwise. Then, γ(P )(i) = γ(P )(i).
Proof of Proposition 6.2:
It suffices to prove the proposition for k = k + 1. Let Q ∈ E γ (P, k) and suppose that Q / ∈ E γ (P, k + 1). Hence, there is a student i and a strategy Q i ∈ Q(k + 1) such that γ(Q i , Q −i )P i γ(Q i , Q −i ). By individual rationality of γ(Q) for P (Proposition 6.1), γ(Q i , Q −i )(i) ∈ S. Note also that Q i must be a list containing exactly k + 1 schools, for otherwise it would also be a profitable deviation in Γ γ (P, k), contradicting Q ∈ E γ (P, k).
Let s be the last school listed in Q i . We claim that γ(Q i , Q −i )(i) = s. Suppose not. Consider the truncation of Q i after γ(Q i , Q −i )(i) and denote this list by Q i . In other words, Q i is the list obtained from Q i by making all schools listed after γ(Q i , Q −i )(i) unacceptable. Note that Q i is a list with at most k schools, i.e., Q i ∈ Q(k). It follows from the DA-algorithm that γ(
From Lemma A.1, it follows that with Q i = s we have γ(
Proof of Proposition 6.3:
The inclusion S(P ) ⊆ O γ (P, 1) follows from Proposition 6.1. We prove O γ (P, 1) ⊆ S(P ). Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ E γ (P, 1) but γ(Q) / ∈ S(P ). From Proposition 6.1 it follows that at γ(Q) some student has justified envy. So, there are two students i, j ∈ I, i = j, with γ(Q)(j) = s ∈ S, sP i γ(Q)(i), and f s (i) < f s (j). Now consider the strategy
Lemma A.2 Let f be a strongly cyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there is a school choice problem P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γ γ (P, k), i.e., for some Q ∈ E γ (P, k), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ).
Proof: Since f is strongly cyclic, we may assume, without loss of generality, that students {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 } and schools {s 1 , s 2 } constitute a strong cycle. In fact, we may assume, without loss of generality, that
Consider the students' preferences P given below.
Unacceptable schools are not depicted. There are three possibilities for the priority ordering f s 2 of school s 2 :
We apply the DA-algorithm (with students proposing) to P . First note that by the construction of P and (b) and (c), all students in {i 4 , i qs 1 +qs 2 +1 } are assured (and in fact are assigned) a seat at their most preferred school. Since for each j ∈ {q s 1 + q s 2 + 2, . . . , n}, student i j finds all schools unacceptable, one seat of each of the schools s 1 and s 2 remains to be assigned to the students in {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 }. One easily verifies that the DA-algorithm in each of the three cases (i), (ii), and (iii), assigns students i 1 and i 3 to schools s 1 and s 2 , respectively. We obtain the same matching if we apply the DA-algorithm to P with schools proposing. Hence, there is a unique stable matching µ * = µ I [P ] = µ S [P ] for P in which students i 1 and i 3 are assigned to schools s 1 and s 2 , respectively (and student i 2 remains unassigned).
Consider the strategy profile Q ∈ Q(k) I given below. We will show that γ(Q) ∈ S(P ) and Q ∈ E γ (P, k).
We apply the DA-algorithm (with students proposing) to Q. Similarly as for P , all students in {i 4 , i qs 1 +qs 2 +2 } are assigned a seat at their most preferred school. One seat of each of the schools s 1 and s 2 remains to be assigned to the students in {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 }. Since Q i 2 is the empty list, and students i 1 and i 3 have different favorite schools at Q, the DA-algorithm assigns in each of the three cases (i), (ii), and (iii), students i 1 and i 3 to schools s 2 and s 1 , respectively. So, γ(Q) = µ * . Since S(P ) = {µ * }, γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). Finally, we check that Q ∈ E γ (P, k). Note that at γ(Q) each of the students i 1 and i 3 is assigned a seat at his/her favorite school. So, nor student i 1 nor i 3 has a profitable deviation from his/her strategy Q i 1 and Q i 3 , respectively. It is easy to check that in any of the cases (i),
(ii), and (iii), and for any strategy Q i 2 ∈ Q(k), γ(Q)R i 2 γ(Q i 1 , Q i 2 , Q i 3 ). In other words, student i 2 does not have a profitable deviation from Q i 2 . Hence, Q ∈ E γ (P, k).
2 Lemma A.3 Let f be a weakly acyclic priority structure. Let 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any school choice problem P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γ γ (P, k) are stable, i.e., for all Q ∈ E γ (P, k), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ).
Before we can prove Lemma A.3 we need to recall a result on the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism.
Lemma A.4 (Ergin, 2002 , Theorem 1, (iv) → (iii) and proof of (iii) → (ii)) Let f be a weakly acyclic priority structure. Then, the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism γ is non-bossy.
Proof of Lemma A.3: Suppose to the contrary that Q ∈ E γ (P, k) but γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). By Proposition 6.1, γ(Q) ∈ F (P, k). So, there are two students i, j ∈ I, i = j and a school s ∈ S such that γ(Q)(j) = s, sP i γ(Q)(i), and f s (i) < f s (j).
Since γ is strategy-proof when there are no restrictions on the length of the (revealed) preference lists (i.e., when the quota equals m, the number of schools), γ(
By Lemma A.4, γ is non-bossy. Hence, γ(
Proof of Theorem 6.6: Follows immediately from Proposition 6.1 and Lemmas A.2 and A.3. 2
B Appendix: Proofs Section 7
The following observation on the Top Trading Cycles algorithm is key for the results in Section 7.
Observation B.1 In the TTC algorithm, once a student points to a school it will keep on pointing to the school in subsequent steps until he is assigned to a seat at the school or until the school has no longer available seats. Similarly, once a school points to a student it will keep on pointing to the student in subsequent steps until the student is assigned to a seat at this or some other school.
Next, we introduce the following graph-theoretic notation to provide concise proofs of our results. Let Q ∈ Q I . Suppose the TTC algorithm is applied to Q and suppose it terminates in no less than l steps. We denote by G τ (Q, l) the (directed) graph that corresponds to step l. In this graph, the set of vertices V τ (Q, l) is the set of agents present in step l. For any
if agent v points to agent v , which will also be denoted by e(Q, l, v) = v . By the TTC algorithm, for any student i ∈ V τ (Q, l) ∩ I, if i points to v , then Q i ranks v higher than any other agent in (V τ (Q, l) ∩ S) ∪ i. Similarly, for any school s ∈ V τ (Q, l) ∩ S, if s points to student i, then i has a higher priority for s than any other student in V τ (Q, l) ∩ I. A path (from v 1 to v p ) in G τ (Q, l) is an ordered list of agents (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p ) such that v r ∈ V τ (Q, l) for all r = 1, . . . , p and each v r points to v r+1 for all r = 1, . . . , p − 1. A self-cycle (i) of a student i is a degenerate path: i points to himself in G τ (Q, l). An agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) is a follower of an agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) if there is a path from v to v in G τ (Q, l). The set of followers of v is denoted by F τ (Q, l, v) . An agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) is a predecessor of an agent v ∈ V τ (Q, l) if there is a path from v to v in G τ (Q, l). The set of predecessors of v is denoted by P τ (Q, l, v) . A cycle in G τ (Q, l) is a path (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v p ) such that also v p points to v 1 . Note that a self-cycle is a special case of a cycle. With a slight abuse of notation we sometimes refer to a cycle as the corresponding non ordered set of involved agents. Finally, for v ∈ I ∪ S, let σ τ (Q, v) denote the step of the TTC algorithm at which agent v is removed.
For the sake of convenience, we relegate the proof of Proposition 7.1. For the moment we only need and state the following lemma.
Lemma B.2 Let P be a school choice problem. For any
Proof of Proposition 7.3: Let Q ∈ E ϕ (P, k). Suppose Q / ∈ E ϕ (P, k ). Then there exists a student, say i, and a list
To prove Lemma 7.4 we need the following lemma.
Lemma B.3 Let Q ∈ Q I . Let i ∈ I and Q i ∈ Q. Suppose that τ (Q)(i) = τ ( Q)(i). Let p and p be the steps at which student i is assigned in T T C(Q) and T T C( Q), respectively. Let r = min{p, p}. Then, at steps g = 1, . . . , r − 1,
(a) at steps 1, . . . , r − 1, the same cycles form in T T C(Q) and T T C( Q);
there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either G τ (Q, r) or G τ ( Q, r) (but not both).
Proof: Item (a) follows from the proof of a result in Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999, Lemma 1) or Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003, Lemma) . As for Item (b), from the definition of r, i ∈ V τ (Q, r) ∩ V τ ( Q, r). The remainder of Item (b) follows directly from Item (a). Item (c) follows from Items (a), (b), and the fact that Q j = Q j for all students j ∈ I\i. By definition of r, there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in G τ (Q, r) or G τ ( Q, r). By the assumption that τ (Q)(i) = τ ( Q)(i), e(Q, r, i) = e( Q, r, i). In particular, C is not a cycle in both G τ (Q, r) and
Proof of Lemma 7.4: Let Q ∈ Q I . Let i ∈ I and define Q i = τ (Q)(i) ∈ Q(1). We have to show that τ ( Q i , Q −i ) = τ (Q). By non-bossiness of τ , it is sufficient to show that τ (
So, suppose τ (Q)(i) = s * ∈ S. Suppose to the contrary that τ ( Q)(i) = τ (Q)(i). Then, since Q i = τ (Q)(i) = s * , student i remains unassigned under Q, i.e., τ ( Q)(i) = i. Let p and p be the steps at which student i is assigned in T T C(Q) and T T C( Q), respectively. Let r = min{p, p}. By Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in either G τ (Q, r) or G τ ( Q, r) (but not both).
Since student i is assigned through cycle C and τ (Q)(i) = s * , e(Q, r, i) = s * . Since e( Q, r, i) = e(Q, r, i) and Q i = τ (Q)(i) = s * , e( Q, r, i) = i. Hence, at the beginning of step r of T T C( Q), school s * has no available seats, i.e., q Q,r
Since both Case 1 and Case 2 yield a contradiction, we conclude τ ( Q)(i) = τ (Q)(i). Proof: By Observation B.1, each agent in the path from v to v will keep on pointing to the same agent at least until the step in which agent v is removed, i.e., step σ τ (Q, v). Hence,
In other words, agent v is removed at the same step as agent v. Then, all agents in the path from v to v form part of a cycle at this step. In particular, v and v are removed in the same cycle. 2
With a slight abuse of notation, for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r , denote
Also note
We are done if we prove the following Claim(l) for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r .
) and e(Q, l, v) = e(Q , l, v). Indeed Claim (l) immediately implies the following Consequence(l):
We now prove by induction that Claim(l) is true for each l, p ≤ l ≤ r . By Lemma B.3 (b) and (c),
If r = p we are done. So, suppose r = p. Let l be a step such that p < l ≤ r . Assume Claim(g) is true for all g, p ≤ g < l ≤ r . We prove that Claim(l) is true. Let v ∈ V τ (Q , l)\P l . By (2) and (3)
From (2) and (3)
Together with (8) this implies
Since v ∈ V τ (Q , l), v is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q ). Then by (4) and (5), v is also not removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q). Hence, v ∈ V τ (Q, l). Assume Claim(l) is not true, i.e., e(Q, l, v) = e(Q , l, v). Let x = e(Q, l, v) and x = e(Q , l, v). Since v ∈ P l , x ∈ P l . By (2), x ∈ P l−1 . By (3) and x ∈ V τ (Q , l), x ∈ V τ (Q , l − 1). By Claim(l), x ∈ V τ (Q, l − 1). We distinguish between the following two subcases. Case 2a: Agent x is removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q). By x ∈ V τ (Q , l − 1)\P l−1 and Consequence(l − 1), F τ (Q, l − 1, x ) = F τ (Q , l − 1, x ). Since at step l − 1 of T T C(Q) agent x is removed, x is in some cycle C in G τ (Q, l − 1). Hence, C is also a cycle in G τ (Q , l − 1) and
From (2) and (3), x ∈ V τ (Q , g)\P g for each step g, p ≤ g < l. From Consequence(g) (p ≤ g < l), F τ (Q, g, x ) = F τ (Q , g, x ) for each step g, p ≤ g < l.
Together with (8) this implies for s ∈ S ∩ x .
Recall that x is removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q). Then, by (6) and (7), x is also removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q ). Hence, x ∈ V τ (Q , l), a contradiction with x = e(Q , l, v). Case 2b: Agent x is not removed at the end of step l − 1 in T T C(Q).
Then, x ∈ V τ (Q, l). Since e(Q, l, v) = x and x = x , we have xQ v x . Since v ∈ P l , v = i. Hence, since e(Q , l, v) = x , x ∈ V τ (Q , l). So, agent x was removed in some step g * , 1 ≤ g * ≤ l − 1, in T T C(Q ). In fact, by Lemma B.3(a), p ≤ g * ≤ l − 1. Note that no agent in P r is removed before the end of step r . By (2), x ∈ P g * . Hence, x ∈ V τ (Q , g * )\P g * . By an argument similar to that of Case 2b, one shows that agent x is also removed at the end of step g * in T T C(Q).
Hence, x ∈ V τ (Q, l), a contradiction with x = e(Q, l, v). 2 Lemma B.6 Let Q ∈ Q I . Let i ∈ I and Q i ∈ Q. Suppose there exists a student j ∈ I\i such that τ (Q)(j) = τ (Q )(j). Then, 
By definition of p, p ≤ p , and Lemma B.3(d), there is a cycle C with i ∈ C in G τ (Q, p) but not in G τ (Q , p). We first prove (a). By Lemma B.3(b), for each student h ∈ I\i with σ τ (Q, h) < p or σ τ (Q , h) < p, τ (Q)(h) = τ (Q )(h). Since τ (Q)(j) = τ (Q )(j), there are r, r ≥ p (possibly r = r ) with r = σ τ (Q, j) and r = σ τ (Q , j). So, σ τ (Q, i) = p ≤ r = σ τ (Q, j). Suppose σ τ (Q, i) = σ τ (Q, j). We have to show that j ∈ C. Suppose to the contrary that j ∈ C. Then, j ∈ C * for some cycle, say C * , C * = C, of G τ (Q, p). Note i ∈ C * . Since e(Q, p, v) = e(Q , p, v) for each agent v ∈ V τ (Q, p)\i, C * is also a cycle in G τ (Q , p). In particular, τ (Q)(j) = τ (Q )(j), a contradiction. This completes the proof of (a).
We now prove (b). We distinguish between two cases. Case 1: j ∈ P τ (Q , p, i). Then, (b) follows directly from Lemma B.4 withQ = Q , v = j, and v = i. Case 2: j ∈ P τ (Q , p, i). Assume that (b) is not true. In other words, assume that σ τ (Q , i) > σ τ (Q , j) or [σ τ (Q , i) = σ τ (Q , j) and i and j are assigned in different cycles in T T C(Q )].
Note σ τ (Q, i) = p ≤ r = σ τ (Q , j) ≤ σ τ (Q , i) = p . So, by Lemma B.5, if v ∈ V τ (Q , r )\(P τ (Q , r , i) ∪ i), then v ∈ V τ (Q, r ) and F τ (Q, r , v) = F τ (Q , r , v) .
By definition of r , j ∈ V τ (Q , r ). By Lemma B.4, j ∈ (P τ (Q , r , i)∪i). Hence, j ∈ V τ (Q, r ) and F τ (Q, r , j) = F τ (Q , r , j). Since σ τ (Q , j) = r , student j forms part of a cycle, say C , in G τ (Q , r ). Hence, C = F τ (Q , r , j). So, also C = F τ (Q, r , j). Hence, student j is assigned to the same school (or himself) in T T C(Q) and T T C(Q ), contradicting τ (Q)(j) = τ (Q )(j). This completes the proof of (b).
2 From Lemma B.2, O τ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ). We now prove that also O τ (P, k) ⊆ IR(P ) ∩ N W (P ). By Proposition 7.6 we may assume k = 1. Let Q ∈ E τ (P, 1). Suppose to the contrary that τ (Q) is wasteful, i.e., there is a student i ∈ I and a school s ∈ S such that |τ (Q)(s)| < q s and sP i τ (Q)(i). Let Q i = s. We show that τ (Q i , Q −i )(i) = s. (Since this contradicts Q ∈ E τ (P, 1) we are done.) First observe that Q i = s contains only school s. Hence, if τ (Q i , Q −i )(i) ∈ S, then τ (Q i , Q −i )(i) = s. So, suppose τ (Q i , Q −i )(i) = i. By definition of the TTC algorithm, in T T C(Q ) all seats of school s are assigned to other students. So, |τ (Q)(s)| < q s = |τ (Q )(s)|. Hence, there exists a student j ∈ S, j = i, such that τ (Q )(j) = s and τ (Q)(j) = s. Since Q j = Q j ∈ Q(1) and τ (Q )(j) = s, we have Q j = Q j = s. Hence, τ (Q)(j) = j. By definition of the TTC algorithm, in T T C(Q) all seats of school s are assigned to other students. In other words, at the end of of T T C(Q) school s has no available seats. So, |τ (Q)(s)| = q s , a contradiction.
2
In order to prove Theorem 6.6 we need the following lemmas.
Lemma B.8 Let f be a cyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, there is a profile of student preferences P with an unstable equilibrium outcome in the game Γ τ (P, k), i.e., for some Q ∈ E τ (P, k), τ (Q) ∈ S(P ).
Proof : By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006a) , there is a school choice problem P such that τ (P ) is not stable. Since τ is group strategy-proof, P ∈ E τ (P, m). Hence, by Corollary 7.6, τ (P ) ∈ O τ (P, m) = O τ (P, k). Hence, there is a list profile Q ∈ Q(k) I such that Q ∈ E τ (P, k) and τ (Q) = τ (P ) ∈ S(P ). 2
Lemma B.9 Let f be an acyclic priority structure. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Then, for any profile of student preferences P all equilibrium outcomes in the game Γ τ (P, k) are stable, i.e., for all Q ∈ E τ (P, k), τ (Q) ∈ S(P ). Moreover, S(P ) ⊆ O τ (P, k).
In order to prove Lemma B.9 we need the following result due to Kesten (2006) .
Lemma B.10 (Kesten, 2006a, Lemma 1) If a priority structure contains a strong cycle, then it also contains a cycle.
Proof of Lemma B.9: Let Q ∈ E τ (P, k). By Theorem 1 of Kesten (2006) , τ = γ. Hence, Q ∈ E γ (P, k) and τ (Q) = γ(Q). By Lemma B.10, f does not contain a strong cycle. Hence, by Proposition 6.3 (for k = 1) or Theorem A.3 (for k ≥ 2), γ(Q) ∈ S(P ). Finally, from τ = γ and Proposition 6.1 it follows that S(P ) ⊆ O τ (P, k). 2
Proof of Theorem 6.6: Follows immediately from Lemmas B.8 and B.9. 2
